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The economic and political crises that have recently engulfed the countries of Southeast 
Asia provide a stark reminder of just how difficult the challenge of sustained regional 
development  remains. In retrospect, the hyperbole that surrounded the ‘East Asian 
miracle’ looks overblown, and testimony to the manner in which rhetoric can outstrip 
reality, especially in the minds of international investors. Certainly, some observers had 
questioned the depth and resilience of capitalist development in Southeast Asia,2 but in 
the years immediately prior to 1997 such analyses tended to be in the minority. Now, of 
course, it is painfully obvious that much of Southeast Asia’s economic and political 
development was extremely fragile. And yet, when seen in historical context, this 
outcome should not have been so surprising. For the fact remains that the countries of 
modern Southeast Asia, both as independent nations and as colonies of various imperial 
powers, have been highly vulnerable to the actions of powerful external political and 
economic forces. This paper will examine the economic bases and the political 
consequences of this vulnerablity, both domestically and at a regional level. I argue that 
the recent crisis has served as an unwelcome reminder of just how constrained, dependent 
and vulnerable the Southeast Asia region’s development prospects remain, a situation that 
is exacerbated by, and which contributes to, domestic political crises.  
 
The first part of this paper places the Southeast Asian region in its specific historical 
context. It is simply not possible to understand the economic challenges and the political 
responses that have emerged in Southeast Asia without giving appropriate consideration 
to the – often overwhelmingly powerful – external forces that have shaped the region.  
Not only have such forces fundamentally influenced the course of domestic political and 
economic development, leading to a concomitant preoccupation with nation-building and 
the protection of national sovereignty, but they have also underpinned a number of 
important intra-regional developments. Consequently, the second part of the paper looks 
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at the political-economy of Southeast Asia, especially in the aftermath of the crisis, as 
this places fundamental constraints on possible future development. Finally, I consider 
what sort of presence the Southeast Asian region has on the wider world stage in which 
inter-regional interaction is coming to play an increasingly important role. Here I suggest 
that the historical pattern of Southeast Asian vulnerability and subordination to greater 
external forces looks set to continue, despite the efforts of local political elites. 
 
Southeast Asia in Historical Context 
 
The disparate ethnic and  religious formations that are so characteristic of Southeast Asia, 
present a major initial challenge to national and regional coherence -  for policymakers 
and analysts. The incorporation of much of Southeast Asia into a powerful, increasingly 
global capitalist system in a process that fundamentally transformed existent social 
structures and gave economic control to the colonial powers, helps to explain why most 
of Southeast Asia has been plagued by poverty ever since.3  Yet, this common history, 
especially when combined with the more recent experience of Japanese militarism, 
decolonisation, the impact of the Cold War and the structurally embedded position the 
region occupies in the international system, means that for all its striking heterogeneity, it 
makes sense to think of Southeast Asia in particular and East Asia more generally as an 
increasingly distinctive region.4 
 
The origins of the contemporary political structures of Southeast Asia, and many of the 
problems that have subsequently confronted them, can be traced to the colonial powers’ 
intrusion into, and subsequent withdrawal from, Southeast Asia over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The expansion of the states system from Europe 
throughout the rest of the world not only generated an overarching institutional 
infrastructure into which the freshly minted states of post-colonial Asia would 
subsequently aspire to fit,5 but it also profoundly influenced the domestic shape of those 
states. The development of domestic bureaucracies, the scope and style of government, 
and the increasing centralisation of power, all reflected the influence of European 
organisational practices6  And yet, when many of the European colonial powers were 
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finally expelled from the region in the aftermath of the Second World War, the newly 
independent governments found themselves confronting profound challenges of nation-
building and economic development. 
 
The challenges of independence 
 
The leaders of Southeast Asia’s newly independent nations therefore faced acute 
problems, not the least of which was the challenge of nation-building itself. This problem 
was compounded by the complex ethnic legacy of colonialism. The dominant European 
powers encouraged large scale migration into the region to supply the labour needs of 
their colonial empires. Labour from China in particular, not only created racial divisions 
which have provided potential sources of social conflict in countries like Indonesia and 
Malaysia, but they laid the foundations for an enduring source of economic power that 
has shaped subsequent economic and political development throughout the region. As a 
consequence of these multifaceted questions of ethnic and national identity, which were 
compounded by the difficulty of operating within fragile political structures that often 
lacked political legitimacy, to say nothing of the broader challenge of promoting 
economic development, the governments of these emergent nations developed a 
predictable preoccupation with internal stability and security.7 In such circumstances, the 
development of the authoritarian rule that has been characteristic of much of the region’s 
history is, perhaps, unsurprising. Whatever we may think of such patterns of rule and 
development, the key point to emphasise here is that the wider geo-political environment 
in which such contingent political practices were nourished has been transformed, 
exposing the region to sustained external reformist pressure. 
 
The post-war geo-strategic situation in which the states of Southeast Asia either gained, 
or in the case of Thailand, attempted to consolidate their independence, was a complex 
mixture of threats and opportunities. Although the economically tiny and militarily 
insignificant nations of the region were incapable of independently affecting the 
overarching security environment of which they were a part, for some countries there 
were potential advantages to be exploited. The Vietnam war may have been a tragedy for 
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much of Indo-China, but for countries like Singapore and Thailand, it provided – in much 
the same way as the earlier Korean War had for Northeast Asia – a catalyst for export-
oriented industrialisation.8 The end of this sort of strategic rivalry in Asia means that a 
fundamentally new set of circumstances obtains, one in which the US is less prepared to 
tolerate economic and political practises of which it does not approve,9  a consideration 
that has profound implications for Southeast Asia. Before considering regional responses 
to the reality of Asian decline and US ascendancy, it is important to consider why Asia in 
general and Southeast Asia in particular find themselves in such a vulnerable position. 
 
 
The rise and fall of the Southeast Asian miracle 
 
When the World Bank produced its seminal report on East Asia’s ‘miraculous’ economic 
development, it was not just describing established industrial powers like Japan and the 
celebrated ‘tiger’ economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Also included 
in this group of stellar performers were Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.10 When judged 
by the remarkable economic growth rates they began to achieve from the 1960s onwards, 
their inclusion is not as surprising as it may now seem with the benefit of hindsight. We 
now know, of course, that Southeast Asia in general was especially badly affected by the 
crisis, but it is important to remember that before the crisis hit there were very few 
sceptics about either the basis or the resilience of the region’s phenomenal performance.11 
Paradoxically enough, the positive sentiment evinced toward the region as a whole, not 
just by influential international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, but also 
by increasingly powerful institutional investors, played a major part in unravelling the 
Southeast Asian component of the ‘Asian miracle’. Ill-informed institutional investors 
recklessly and indiscriminately poured money into ‘Asia’, creating unsustainable 
economic bubbles, especially  in the smaller Southeast Asian economies.12 Indeed, one of 
the enduring factors that the crisis highlighted, and which contributed to the dramatic 
transformation in the region’s fortunes, has been a widespread failure to adequately 
discriminate between the Northern and Southern parts of ‘East Asia’ generally, and  
between the individual countries that constitute these very different areas in particular. 
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The first step in trying to understand why the countries of Southeast were so badly 
affected by the crisis, therefore, is to distinguish between the successive waves of 
industrialisation and economic development that have occurred in the broader East Asian 
region. Significantly, the original Asian miracle – Japan – was already an established 
industrial power even before World War 2. Despite the devastating blow the war dealt 
Japan, it had a basic institutional infrastructure, replete with a competent bureaucracy and 
– at that time – highly effective business-government relations which allowed it to ‘catch-
up’ with its North America and western European rivals in a remarkable and 
unprecedentedly short space of time.13  The Japanese pattern of state-led industrialisation 
and economic development proved an influential model for the majority of the second 
wave of industrialising nations that followed in its wake. Of the very successful ‘gang of 
four’ – Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong – only Hong Kong was not highly 
influenced by the Japanese exemplar.14 Crucially, however, these successful acolytes 
possessed a number of fundamental advantages that allowed them to emulate much of 
Japan’s success in an even more truncated time frame. On the one hand, they were able to 
take advantage of a general up-turn in, and restructuring of, the wider global economy, 
allowing them to occupy specialist niches in an emergent ‘new international division of 
labour’. On the other hand, they were able to target lucrative export markets, especially in 
the US, secure in the knowledge that their often unashamedly mercantilist economic 
strategies would be tolerated because of the US’s wider strategic interests. Arguably of 
greatest significance, however, was the existence of significant ‘state capacity’, 
underpinned by competent and relatively independent bureaucracies.15 
 
Southeast Asia, by contrast, faced a very different set of circumstances. Firstly, the 
industrialisation process generally and the switch to export-oriented development in 
particular, occurred later than in other parts of the region. Whereas countries like Taiwan 
and  Korea had rapidly industrialised from the 1950s and shifted toward the promotion of 
export-oriented manufacturing industries during the 1960s, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia did not consolidate the transition to more industrialised, export-oriented  
economies until the 1970s and 1980s.16 Significantly, this process was accelerated by, 
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and largely dependent on, the foreign investment strategies of multinational corporations, 
especially from Japan, taking advantage of emergent international production strategies 
in which the region provided an endless supply of cheap labour.17 While such investment 
clearly accelerated the industrialisation process, as barriers to entry in formerly lucrative 
manufacturing sectors fell,18 so did returns - a problem which was compounded by the 
structure of regional production. 
 
The idea that the East Asian region would collectively make  steady progress toward 
increasingly sophisticated forms of industrial production underpinned some of the most 
powerful ideas about the region  and  the concomitant prospects for an ‘Asian century’.19 
Amongst a number of influential – mainly Japanese – economists, this idea was captured 
in the metaphor of the ‘flying geese’, in which Japan pioneered the Asian route to 
industrial development and pulled along the other regional economies in its wake.20  The 
reality has been very different. Not only have Japanese companies often not transferred 
technology to those countries at the bottom of the developmental pyramid in Southeast 
Asia, but they have not necessarily shifted out of lower-value added production in the 
expected manner either.21 Consequently, many neighbouring countries have not only 
found it difficult to break into some of the more lucrative and sophisticated  forms of 
manufacturing, or to establish the sorts of complex domestic linkages that have allowed a 
‘deepening’ of the industrialisation process to occur.22  The smaller economies of the 
region have, however, found themselves caught up in a web of complex and constricting 
economic and political relationships where investment has occurred.23  
 
Japan’s dominance of the wider East Asian economic region has implications that merit 
elaboration. Firstly, Japan has been a crucial source of investment for the rest of the 
region, especially in the wake of the so-called Plaza Accord24 which saw a fundamental 
restructuring of Japanese industry as a consequence of the yen’s appreciation. The 
massive outflows of Japanese capital that intensified at the end of the 1980s had an 
important global impact, but were especially influential amongst the smaller Southeast 
Asian economies.25 But as Japanese industry moved offshore it did so with the assistance 
of the Japanese government in a co-ordinated manner that reproduced the hierarchical 
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dominance of Japanese industry across the region, effectively locking other countries into 
subordinate and dependent positions.26 As a consequence, the triangular relationship 
between Japan, its Asian neighbours and the lucrative markets of North America and 
Europe was consolidated, as Japan exported capital goods to Asia and finished products 
to the US. Southeast Asia found itself simultaneously dependant on, and vulnerable to, 
Japan, and to the export markets that underpinned Southeast Asia’s industrialisation 
strategies. The structural development of industry in Southeast Asia and its location in the 
wider regional scheme of things, helps to explain the impact of the crisis. 
 
 
Southeast Asia in crisis 
 
There is no intention of re-telling the story of the East Asian economic crisis in any detail 
here, as numerous accounts now exist of this episode.27 However, it is necessary to 
highlight a number of aspects of the crisis as it both transformed the way Southeast Asia 
is viewed by potential investors and the powerful IFIs like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and fundamentally altered the circumstances in which future development 
will take place.  
 
The first point to make about the crisis is that there are a number quite different 
explanations of what happened, even though most observers agree on the basic facts. In 
essence, the story of the East Asian economic collapse is that in late 1997 a localised 
currency crisis in Thailand rapidly and unexpectedly spread throughout Southeast Asia 
and then on to Korea and even Japan. This caused a massive withdrawal of capital from 
the region, a major loss of confidence in most of its economies, and a collapse in foreign 
exchange and equity markets as a consequence. In countries like Korea, Malaysia, and 
especially Thailand and Indonesia, economic collapse was followed by political 
instability, as a number of countries in the region rapidly descended into a negative 
downward spiral in which declining confidence undermined local currencies, creating 
further problems for domestic banks, companies and ultimately households.28 Although 
the IMF was quickly called in to try and restore stability, a number of influential 
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observers have argued that its actions actually made things worse rather then better,29 and 
that its heavy-handed intervention fuelled a sense of resentment about the region’s 
vulnerable position in the international system.30    
 
Plainly, there were problems associated with the ‘minister’s nephew’ syndrome, in which 
political connections were often more important than economic credibility in accessing 
foreign funds from domestic financial intermediaries with little regulatory oversight.31 
Yet the existence of ‘crony capitalism’ and the possible distortion of market forces is not 
a sufficient explanation of the region’s problems. Indeed, if such factors were so 
important, why were they not highlighted as dangers and obstacles to growth by either 
potential investors or institutions like the IMF before the crisis? In a noteworthy 
fracturing of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’32 that underpinned the market-based 
international economic orthodoxy, the World Bank’s chief economist argued that there is 
no simple relationship between ‘corruption’, a lack of transparency and economic crisis. 
On the contrary, Stiglitz  pointed out that China, one of the least open or transparent 
countries in the region, had been insulated because it had a closed capital account and a 
non-tradeable currency.33 The crucial source of vulnerability as far as the Southeast Asian 
economies were concerned, then,  was to embark upon rapid financial liberalisation 
without adequate supervisory controls, leaving them exposed to abrupt changes in market 
sentiment and possible rapid capital flight. 
 
In short, the crisis revealed, yet again, the enduring vulnerability of the countries of 
Southeast Asia to more powerful external forces, both economic and political. Not only 
were these economies decimated as foreign capital withdrew, but their economic systems 
came under sustained reformist pressure form the likes of the US and the IMF as a 
consequence. The influential IFIs associated with post-war US hegemony have 
effectively established the international ‘rules of the game’ by which less powerful, 
smaller economies much compete, often on highly unfavourable terms.34 What is 
significant about the recent crisis is that the vulnerable and dependant position of 
Southeast Asia meant the IFIs could attempt to extend this process directly to the 
domestic economies of the most badly affected countries.  Before considering the 
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implications of these latter developments, it is worth spelling out just how economically 




Southeast Asia’s current economic position 
 
One of the fundamental weaknesses that the Asian crisis exposed was the degree of 
indebtedness that some of the most affected countries had developed. However, it is 
important to note that unlike earlier debt crises in Latin America, the Asian debt problem 
was overwhelming a private sector affair: a symbiotic relationship developed between 
cash-rich lenders in the ‘North’ and would-be borrowers in the ‘South’, which both 
parties appeared to believe was a certain source of continuing profitability. Even though 
governments were generally not directly involved in such relationships, the build up of 
debt before the crisis, particularly the short-term form which could be rapidly withdrawn, 
was one of the major factors that allowed the crisis to develop with such rapidity. In 
1996, prior to the crisis, short-term debt represented more than 40% of overall borrowing 
in Thailand and about  25% of borrowing in Indonesia and Malaysia. As a percentage of 
foreign reserves, short-term debt represented about 100% in Thailand, 80% in the 
Philippines, and a remarkable 176% in Indonesia35 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, private capital flows to the developing world generally have 
declined, as have indebtedness ratios as a consequence.36 In Southeast Asia, however, 
indebtedness ratios were still on the rise in 1998 in the immediate aftermath of the crisis 
and the currency collapses it initiated.37 Simply put, as the region’s pegged exchange 
rates collapsed and their respective currencies plummeted, the cost of servicing hitherto 
cheap external borrowings blew out, compounding the affected nations problems. In such 
circumstances, the ability of the hardest hit countries like Indonesia and Thailand to resist 
the demands of the IMF in return for crucial financial was limited despite noteworthy 
domestic opposition to the role of the IMF across the region.38 
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Despite the loss of faith in the region by the holders of mobile portfolio capital and short-
term lenders, with the noteworthy exception of Indonesia, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
apparently held up surprisingly well.39 There are three important caveats to note here, 
however. Firstly, the bulk of the continuing flows of FDI into the region were directed 
toward merger and acquisition activity. In other words, new FDI was intended to take 
over existing assets that had suddenly become extremely cheap as a consequence of the 
region’s collapsing currencies.40  Secondly, Japan has become a much less significant 
source of investment for Southeast Asia than it has been in the past.41 From its peak in 
1996 when Japanese bank lending accounted for 40% of all lending in Asia, it had fallen 
to 28% by 1999, reflecting Japan’s own domestic economic problems. Japanese FDI also 
fell by 71% during 1998, with only 20% of Japanese companies indicating that they 
intended to undertake new investment.42 Thirdly, China has received the lion’s share of 
new FDI flow into the East Asian region.43 The potential size of China’s domestic 
market, its imminent access to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and its increasing 
presence in precisely the same sort of low-end manufacturing that has traditionally been 
Southeast Asia’s great strength, has meant that China has emerged as a formidable 
competitor, not least as a potential regional investment location.44 Again, the increasing 
disparity in economic weight between a rising China and the much smaller economies of 
Southeast Asia leave the latter potentially vulnerable to competitive pressures from their 
much larger regional neighbour, a problem which looks likely to intensify as China 
develops. 
 
Southeast Asia’s trade relations have centred on the region’s other ‘great powers’, Japan 
and America. Japan has supplied the capital and technology with which the Southeast 
Asian countries have produced commodities for sale in other countries, primarily the 
US.45 As a consequence, and despite rising exports of intermediate products to Japan, 
Southeast Asian countries have tended to run substantial trade deficits with Japan and 
trade surpluses with the US. Although this has helped the industrialisation process 
throughout the region, it has tended  to reinforce its vulnerability and dependence. 
Consequently, a number of countries are heavily dependent on continued access to and 
demand for exports of manufactures, especially electrical goods to the US and to a lesser 
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extent Japan.46 In the event of a sustained downturn in the US, countries like Malaysia 
look extremely exposed to shifting external conditions. Revealingly, Singapore – long 
considered the regional benchmark of competent economic management – has 
succumbed to a recession caused largely by its dependence on North American markets.47 
Although, intra-regional East Asian trade now accounts for nearly half of overall trade,48  
much of this is a reflection of the pivotal role of Japan and the trade in intermediate 
goods. Significantly, more than a quarter of the region’s exports continue to be absorbed 
by North America, a factor that continues to influence the behaviour and limit the options 
of the countries of East Asia. 
 
Overall, then, while the Southeast Asian nations have reaped some benefits from their 
incorporation into an overarching regional division of labour, their position remains 
dependent and vulnerable.  Not only can changes in market sentiment inflict major 
damage on their economies and developmental prospects leaving them vulnerable to the 
influence of powerful IFIs, but the manner of their integration into regional and global 
production structures means that industrialisation processes are often shaped by patterns 
of economic integration that remain centred on the established industrial heartlands of 
North America, Western Europe and Northeast Asia.49 In such circumstances, the 
countries of Southeast Asia have attempted to develop political and strategic responses 
that will lessen their vulnerability and improve their overall position. An examination of 




The Politics of Economic Vulnerability 
 
The current situation in post-crisis Southeast Asia is sufficiently dire to have undermined 
the more optimistic prognoses about its development that were so prevalent only four of 
five years ago. Paradoxically enough, what seems to be emerging in the region is a 
volatile combination of continuity and change, that reflects a complex mix of internal and 
external factors. Both are important and merit examination. 
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Domestic political pressures 
 
At the outset, it should be re-emphasised that political development in Southeast Asia is 
intimately bound up with, and cannot be separated from,  prevailing  economic 
circumstances. While the state may have played a significant role in most of East Asia’s 
developmental experience, in Southeast Asia the relationship between key economic 
actors and political elites has often be extremely close, if not inseparable. As a 
consequence, major political and economic players have frequently been precisely the 
same people, with the result  that major political struggles are frequently played out 
within the confines of the state itself, rather than within what are often still modestly 
developed  civil societies.50 This has major implications for the type of future 
development that can be expected to occur – a crucial consideration given the pressure 
placed on these countries to adopt policies in keeping with predominantly ‘western’ ideas 
of ‘good governance’.51 A brief glance at the experiences of some of the more important 
regional countries, especially following the recent crisis, illustrates this point. 
 
Indonesia is both the most populous and the most badly affected of Southeast Asia’s 
crisis countries. Although many celebrated the demise of Suharto, the highly entrenched 
system of patronage politics over which he presided has not disappeared,52 nor has his 
demise ushered in a new era of governmental competence and transparency.  Given the 
scale of Indonesia’s problems this is, perhaps, unsurprising. After years of steady 
economic growth, the scale of Indonesia’s collapse was starkly revealed by the renewed 
spectre of starvation in Indonesia in the aftermath of the crisis.53 Even though some 
limited recovery has now occurred, Indonesia’s future prospects are blighted by the size 
of its accumulated debts. Overall, it is estimated that Indonesia owes some US$ 262 
billion or 170% of GDP, of which US$152 is government debt.54 The agency charged 
with resolving the debt problem and instituting economic reform – the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) -  is widely considered to be incompetent and lacking in 
the political authority to challenge the powerful vested interests that constitute 
Indonesia’s distinctive political-economy.55 Compounding Indonesia’s problems is the 
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simultaneous challenge of attempting to develop new patterns of decentralised political 
rule while confronting the possible fragmentation of the nation itself as ethnic minorities 
take the opportunity to put pressure on a weakened central government. All this at a time 
when the government itself is wracked by internal political manoeuvring and doubts 
about the competence and independence of newly installed President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri.56 
 
Similarly, in the country that was at the original epicentre of the crisis – Thailand – 
although initially praised by the IMF for its willingness to adopt the full panoply of 
neoliberal reforms, ‘money politics’ and political corruption seem as important as ever. 
Thailand’s recent history illustrates the acutely difficult position Southeast Asian 
governments find themselves in. The coalition government of Chuan Leekpai, which took 
office in the immediate aftermath of the original crisis, attempted to demonstrate its 
orthodox economic management credentials to both the IMF and foreign investors. 
However, there has been widespread domestic opposition to the intrusive role of the IMF 
and the painful reforms it advocates, partly from non-governmental organisations and 
organised labour, but also from elements of the domestic business class.57 The massive 
economic contraction that followed in the wake of initial currency crisis – more than 10% 
in both 1997 and 1998 – paved the way for rise of the populist government of prominent 
business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, which rode to power on promises of increased 
public spending and blatant pork-barrelling.  Ominously for the future of Thailand’s 
continuing political reform process, there are signs that Thaksin is using his economic 
leverage and control of the local media to stifle debate about his trial on corruption 
charges.58 Revealingly, Thaksin’s first prime ministerial trip was to Malaysia –  the 
Southeast Asian country which has been most vocal in criticising ‘western’ reform 
initiatives and championing Asian alternatives. 
 
Not only has Malaysia attempted to pursue its own distinctive response to the crisis in 
particular and the challenge of economic development more generally, but it has also  
been at the forefront of promoting East Asian regionalism. The Malaysian response to the 
crisis was motivated both by the apparent failure of the orthodox IMF remedy, and by a 
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number of contingent politico-economic factors that made possibly incurring the wrath of 
foreign investors and the IFIs a risk worth taking. At the heart of Malaysia’s economic 
policies under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has been a desire to 
accommodate or overcome the twin colonial legacies of an ethnically divided population 
and a resource dependent economic structure. This produced a pattern of development in 
which political and economic activities became highly integrated, as the indigenous 
Malay class assumed a pivotal position through policies of positive discrimination. The 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) became the principal expression of this 
dominance and the centre of a comprehensive system of political and economic 
patronage.59 In such circumstances, where non-transparent business-government relations 
are central to the operation of the Malaysian political-economy, it is less surprising that 
Malaysia should be willing to flout conventional orthodoxy and experiment with capital 
controls as a response to the crisis. Importantly, however, and  the self-serving 
motivations for Malaysia’s post-crisis policies notwithstanding, it effectively 
demonstrated that even the governments of small economies have policy options in a 
global economy if they manage to retain a degree of independence.60 
 
If nothing else, the Malaysian experiment – so far, at least – has managed to ward off the 
sort of political crisis that has engulfed Indonesia and the Philippines. The Philippines 
was initially considered to have been less badly affected by the crisis because of its more 
liberalised economy and the substantial economic reforms – including challenging the 
position of politically powerful cartels and monopolies – which occurred under the 
administration of Fidel Ramos during the 1990s.61  It should also be noted, however, that 
the Philippines’ much slower growth rates compared to those of its neighbours during the 
boom years  meant it attracted smaller capital inflows and there was thus less risk of a 
dramatic turn-around in investor sentiment. The subsequent descent into political and – to 
a lesser extent - economic chaos was a major blow to the alternative, IFI-approved, route 
to economic development.62 In any case, the subtleties of the Philippines’ distinctive 
position and liberalisation efforts were clearly lost on foreign investors and currency 
speculators who sold the peso down anyway. Although the election of Joseph Estrada in 
May 1998 was viewed with some dismay by many outside observers who doubted his 
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economic credibility, it is worth pointing out that Estrada persisted with many of the 
personnel and policies - especially the commitment to trade liberalisation - of his 
predecessor. His subsequent exposure and removal for alleged corruption may have 
provided a convenient scapegoat for the apparent failings of orthodox policy reform, but 
it has done little to change the fundamentals of the Philippine economy which remains 
stuck in a ‘developmental bog’.63 On the contrary, the installation of the supposedly 
reformist and ‘clean’ administration of new President Gloria Arroyo, has been described 
as a ‘“soft revolution” that ejected an elected president in order to return to the old, 
wealthy political and business elite to power’.64  
 
Despite the traumas induced by the crisis, therefore, some of the fundamental 
relationships and structures that characterise political and economic relationships in 
Southeast Asia have not been radically transformed. Even though some of the dramatis 
personae may have been changed, the script looks surprisingly familiar. Indeed, it should 
be noted that even in Singapore, clearly Southeast Asia’s most economically  developed 
nation, political liberalisation and a shift from authoritarianism has not been the 
inevitable corollary of rising living standards. On the contrary, the Singaporean 
government has displayed a remarkable capacity to retain a form of one party rule and 
effective social control.65  Somewhat ironically, it may prove to be the newer members of 
Asean and the least developed economies of Southeast Asia -Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia -  which will undergo the most profound long-term changes. Vietnam is the 
quintessential Southeast Asian example of a country which is attempting to make the 
transition from ‘communism’ to capitalism, while attempting to retain some of the 
doctrine, ideology and personnel of its former socialist incarnation. It may find that, 
while it can develop a distinctive form of capitalism, it will effectively obliterate the 






Collective responses to external imperatives 
 
Although Southeast Asia’s domestic difficulties may serve as a stark reminder of the 
individual weakness of the region’s economies and the fragility of its political structures, 
their collective response to crisis and the challenge of vulnerability have been innovative, 
and may yet help to re-shape the  broader East Asian region of which they are a part. The 
proposed ‘Asean + 3’ grouping could – if realised – fundamentally transform the long-
term trajectory of the region and its place in the wider international system. Before 
assessing its prospects, it is useful to re-consider Asean’s own development as this 
illustrates some of the potential pitfalls and benefits that confront the nascent grouping. 
 
The first point to emphasise about Asean’s own evolution was that it was primarily a 
response to the perceived vulnerability of the Asean states at the height of the Cold 
War,67 something that provided a compelling reason to seek greater security through 
collaboration. It should also be stressed that the overall orientation to security that 
distinguishes most of East Asia, and which helps to explain their approach to both 
domestic and foreign policy, owes much to an overwhelming preoccupation with 
maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the state itself. Algappa argues that there are 
three core concerns that underpin this overriding preoccupation with political survival, 
‘territorial integrity, international challenges to their political ideologies, and constraints 
on their autonomy’.68  The attractions of the so-called ‘Asean way’, or the commitment to 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of members, and the preference for consensus-
based decision making processes,  become easier to understand as a consequence.69  
 
It has been suggested that Asean should change this underlying modus operandi and 
allow for greater ‘interference’ in each others domestic affairs. Thailand has played the 
most prominent role in advocating  a policy of ‘flexible engagement’ in which members 
would more  closely coordinate macro economic policies and be given greater licence to 
criticise the domestic policies of fellow members. Significantly, it was Asean’s 
noteworthy failure to play a crisis management role, and its vulnerability to criticisms of 
ineffectiveness and non-transparency that lay behind the Thai initiative.70 Despite this 
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potentially significant proposal, however, the Asean grouping has proved unable to build 
upon it. Not only has the ‘widening’ of Asean to include the less politically and 
economically developed countries of Indochina and Myanmar made both the 
coordination of policies and the deflection of criticisms about human rights issues more 
difficult,71  but Thailand itself has advocated a return to a more ‘Asian way’ under the 
new Thaksin government.72 For Asean sceptics, such behaviour was simply confirmation 
of their belief that Asean was primarily interested ‘in the art of conflict avoidance, but not 
conflict resolution’.73 
 
These developments remind us that there is nothing certain about either the direction or  
sustainability of Asean’s institutional evolution. Nevertheless, Asean is the central actor 
within what could prove to be one of the most significant initiatives in East Asia. ‘Asean 
+ 3’, which includes Japan, China and South Korea in addition to the Asean states, 
represents a potentially major regional grouping with a substantial internal market and 
major financial strength. Indeed, one of the principal attractions of such a grouping was 
the economic weight and thus potential  independence that such a collaborative enterprise 
might provide. The East Asian crisis dramatically highlighted the entire region’s 
vulnerability to both externally-generated economic dislocation, and to subsequent 
political intervention from IFIs and the US. As Asean Secretary General Rodolfo Sevrino 
observed, ‘recent events have made clear that there is no other course but closer 
economic integration and political solidarity in Asean, there are precious few alternatives 
to closer cooperation in the larger region of East Asia’.74 
 
Certainly there is much that could yet derail Asean + 3. Japan’s initial reluctance to 
develop its proposed  Asian Monetary Fund in the face of US opposition,  and the sheer 
technical complexity of developing a currency swap mechanism with which to insulate 
the region from future financial crises, suggests that even if lingering animosities 
between key members can be overcome, it will  be a formidable challenge for the 
region’s limited institutional capacity.75 Nevertheless, the fact that the Asean + 3 
relationship was formalised in late 1999 is indicative of surprising momentum behind the 
project.76 That Asean + 3 has succeeded in at least making a beginning, whereas a similar 
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project sponsored by Malaysia’s Mahathir was frustrated by a combination of US 
opposition and Japanese ambivalence,77 is indicative of greater regional resolve and a 
significantly different post-crisis political context. 
 
Yet, even if Asean + 3 does develop and ultimately offers a more powerful vehicle for the 
expression of East Asian interests, there is no guarantee that this will be of unalloyed 
benefit for the smaller Southeast Asian economies. Certainly, Asean + 3 may provide a 
shell within which East Asian versions of capitalist organisation may continue. It may 
even provide a platform for a rearticulation of the so-called ‘Asian values’ discourse 
which was such a prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during the 
boom years.78 But even a successful Asean + 3 will see its Southeast Asian nations 
overshadowed by the strategic, economic and political weight of their regional 
neighbours.79 In such circumstances, as the earlier relationship with Japan vividly 
demonstrates, there is nothing to suggest that Southeast Asia will easily escape from the 





Southeast Asia has never been the master of its own destiny. Indeed, its very identity, 
economic structures and social formations have shaped by powerful external forces it had 
only a limited capacity to influence of deflect. The recent East Asian crisis vividly 
demonstrated that little has changed in this regard. What has changed, perhaps, is the 
speed with which the multifaceted forces associated with globalisation can profoundly 
undercut the developmental strategies, prospects and autonomy of these nations as they 
grapple with the challenges of complex interdependence in an increasingly integrated 
global political economy. Such forces are proving formidable challenges for even the 
established industrial democracies that can draw on comparatively competent, long-
established state capacities with which to manage them. The more vulnerable nations of 
Southeast Asia are doubly disadvantaged by comparison, in that they have less 
institutional  capacity and more acutely pressing problems with which to deal.80 In such 
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circumstances it is, perhaps, surprising that they made the progress they did before the 
recent crisis brought them undone. 
 
In a region as volatile as Southeast Asia, prediction is a foolhardy enterprise. However, 
the surprising durability of Asean - its lack of tangible achievements notwithstanding - 
suggests that there is desire to maintain some sense of regional solidarity and identity in 
the face of common adversity. If this momentum can be sustained and translated to the 
wider Asean + 3 grouping, the possibility that a more significant regional entity will 
develop - of which the Southeast Asian nations would be an important part – cannot be 
discounted. Whether this will deliver significant benefits to the less powerful nations of 
Southeast Asia is a moot point. It may, however, provide a more insulated environment in 
which distinctively Asian style developmental projects can be taken up once more. 
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